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Abstract
The aim of my paper is to show some elements in Milton’s and Locke’s political writin­
gs, depending on their attitudes to different media. Milton in his argumentation against 
censorship must demonstrate that all the ancient instances for censorship, usually cited 
in his century, can be interpreted as examples of another phenomenon. However, Milton, 
analysing loci of Plato’s Republic and some Scriptural topics, recognises the scope and 
significance of non­conceptual, non­printed, non­verbal forms of communication; he des­
cribes them as signs of childish, female or uneducated behaviours, as valueless phenomena 
from the point of view of political liberty incarnated in the freedom of press. John Locke’s 
attitude is the same. I will show a chain of ideas, similar to Milton’s one, in his Two	Tracts	
on	Government and in his Epistola	de	tolerantia, focusing the analyses on the concept of 
adiaphora (indifferent	things).
Key words
censorship,	orality,	typographical	age,	Plato	on	censorship,	adiaphora,	John	Milton’s	Areo­
pagitica,	John	Locke’s	Epistola de tolerantia
The	main	 topic	of	my	presentation	 is	 John	Milton’s	 argumentation	and	art	
of	rhetoric	in	his	Areopagitica.	However,	Milton	was	not	a	researcher	of	the	
media,	and	his	aim	in	his	booklet	was	not	an	analysis	of	homo typographicus’	
thought	 on	 the	 freedom	of	 thought	 itself,	 depended	 on	 the	medium	of	 the	
printed	book;	his	thinking	inevitably	met	the	links	between	our	ideals	on	the	
freedom	of	thought	and	different	media	by	which	we	express	them.	Milton,	by	
my	interpretation,	met	the	problem	of	media	in	his	Areopagitica	in	two	topics:	
(1)	 in	his	 reinterpretation	of	 the	concept	of	Christian	 freedom;	and	 (2)	 the	
reinterpretation	of	the	Platonic	tradition	on	writing	and	oral	communication.	
We	can	observe	a	common	characteristic	in	both	cases	through	a	historical	ap-
proach:	Milton,	arguing	for the Liberty of Vnlicenc’d Printing,	found	opinions	
1
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John	Milton,	“Areopagitica”,	in:	John	Milton,	
Complete Poetry and Selected Prose,	Cleanth	
Brooks	 (ed.),	 Random	 House,	 New	 York	
1950,	§	13,	p.	685	(I	have	cited	the	text	of	the	
Areopagitica	 according	 to	 the	 text	 and	page	
numbers	of	this	edition,	with	Milton’s	orthog-
raphy	 and	 his	 particular	 use	 of	 capitals	 and	
italics).	 Numbers	 of	 paragraphs	 of	Milton’s	
booklet,	often	used	in	interpretative	publica-
tions	on	this	work,	are	the	same	like	in:	John	
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and	quotations	in	his	culture,	rooted	in	a	non-typographical,	mainly	bi-medial	
state	of	a	more	archaic	literacy	–	only,	they	were	meaningless	for	an	analysis	
of	the	world	of	printed	books.
Milton’s	dilemma	in	his	thought	on	media	is	not	a	special,	personal	peculiar-
ity	of	a	sensitive	poet;	it	is	a	general	ambiguity	of	the	early	modern	Protestant	
political	thinking.	I	can	show	this	generality	within	the	framework	of	my	pres-
entation	by	citing	some	parallel	Lockeian	quotations	in	the	present	lecture.
A new interpretation of ‘Christian freedom’ 
in Milton’s booklet
An	important	element	of	Milton’s	art	of	rhetoric	is	an	opposition	between	the	
idealised	image	of	London,	the	almost	rebuilt	Zion,	living	in	Christian	free-
dom	and	thus	enjoying	the	previously	unknown	prestige	of	a	European	spir-
itual	centre,	and	the	sad	continental	situation	which	is	a	direct	consequence	
of	censorship.	Leaning	on	a	particular	understanding	of	Christian	freedom,	
he	also	wishes	to	persuade	the	audience	of	his	fictive	speech,	the	“Lords	and	
Commons	of	England”,	that	is,	the	two	Houses	of	the	Parliament,	that	book	
censoring	is	(1)	an	un-Christian	thing;	henceforth	(2)	its	existence	can	only	be	
explained	by	some	Papal	guile;	since	(3)	there	is	nothing	similar	mentioned	
in	either	Scriptural,	or	the	gentile	tradition	of	the	Antiquity,	so	it	cannot	be	
legitimated	on	these	bases.	Thus,	Milton	is	forced	by	his	own	line	of	thought	
to	frequently	quote	classical	and	Scriptural	texts	as	examples,	but	he	cannot	
offer	comfortable	examples	for	a	typographic culture	from	Antique	sources.	
It	is	impossible	to	find	classical	texts	in	which	the	judicially	understood	free-
dom	or	banning	of	books	appears	in	exactly	the	same	way	as	for	a	17th-cen-
tury	Englishman	reading	printed	books.	Furthermore,	the	hands	of	the	author	
of	Areopagitica	are	tied	also	by	the	cultural	environment,	by	contemporary	
political	discourse:	if	he	wishes	to	persuade	his	audience,	he	cannot	make	use	
of	each	and	every	element	of	his	considerable	classical	and	theological	eru-
dition,	but	only	of	those	which	are	more	or	less	known,	and	thus	persuasive	
for	his	audience	as	well.	Moreover,	he	also	had	 to	quote	certain	Scriptural	
fragments,	frequently	quoted	in	contemporary	debates,	and	thus	turning	into	
almost	compulsory	citations.
1.
The	first	main	idea	of	Areopagitica,	important	for	my	subject,	is	the	reference	
of	Christian freedom	to	the	freedom	of	reading.	Milton	draws	on	Scriptural	
fragments	which	primarily	referred	to	eating	rules	and	ecclesiastical	regula-
tions,	and	which	were	often	quoted	since	the	debates	of	the	Reformation.	Mil-
ton	transfers	the	meaning	of	Scriptural	fragments	to	the	freedom	of	reading	
books	with	reference	to	spiritual food:
“To	the	pure	all	things	are	pure,	not	only	meats	and	drinks,	but	all	kinde	of	knowledge	whether	
of	good	or	evill;	(…)	For	books	are	as	meats	and	viands	are;”2
One	must	notice	that	Milton	here	does	much	more	than	give	a	free	interpreta-
tion	of	Scriptural	fragments.	If	we	take	into	account	the	discourse	of	the	age	of	
Reformation	and	the	author’s	age,	we	find	reason	to	believe	that	these	refer-
ences	and	the	emphasis	on	the	concept	of	Christian freedom	will	recall	in	the	
17th-century	educated	Protestant	reader	the	terminology	and	issues	of	the	adia­
phora-debates	accompanying	Protestant	cultures	of	the	16th	and	17th	century.
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Adiaphora	 –	Latinised	by	Cicero	 as	 res mediae	 –	 is	 a	Stoic	 term	 for	 ethi-
cally	neutral	circumstances.	In	Christian	thinking	it	means	all	the	things	out	
of	a	direct	divine	order,	and	in	the	Reformation	it	was	a	central	concept	of	
debates	on	the	limits	of	the	earthly	and	Ecclesiastical	rule,	and	it	became	a	
new,	relative	secular	sphere	for	the	discussions	on	politics.	Milton	intends	to	
do	nothing	less	than	reformulate	this	debate,	which	deeply	interested	contem-
porary	Europe,	for	the	benefit	of	spiritual	freedom,	and	within	it	especially	
the	freedom	of	the	culture	of	printed	books.	Perhaps	it	is	not	too	far-fetched	
to	say	that	Milton	wanted	his	public	to	accept	that	Christian	freedom	was	a	
process	 and	 an	 attitude	 continuously	 improving,	which	 started	 somewhere	
in	Zurich,	in	the	16th	century,	with	demonstrations	such	as	Ulrich	Zwingli’s	
sausage	frying	in	the	Lenten	period	–	see	his	Von Erkiesen und Fryheit der 
Spysen3	–	and	led	to	the	freedom	of	the	press	in	England.	(Or	the	other	way	
round:	 the	freedom	of	 the	press	 in	England	 is	nothing	else	 than	one	of	 the	
significant	consequences	of	a	true,	“reformed	Reformation”;	as	Milton	wrote	
in	his	Areopagitica:	“the	reforming	of	Reformation	it	self”.)	The	freedom	of	
sausage	frying	and	the	freedom	of	press	are	not	so	distant	from	each	other	in	
these	adiaphora-debates	than	we	might	think	today.	The	world	of	adiaphora	
not	regulated	by	divine	power,	and	thus	confined	to	human	judgement	–	that	
of	individual	and/or	community,	or	secular	political	power	–	is	the	first	scene	
available	for	the	early	modern	political	community,	and	consequently	the	de-
bate	on	these	issues	is	the	first	debate	of	political	modernity.
The	importance	of	adiaphora-debates	in	the	political	philosophy	is	completed	
by	the	fact	that	the	17th-century	non-clerical	thinkers	in	these	debates	always	
differentiate	between	masses	and	the	elite,	cultures	of	literacy	vs.	orality	and	
gesture-languages.	We	can	 recognise	 this,	 for	 instance,	by	 reading	Locke’s	
texts,	with	his	 permanently-ironical	 style	while	 speaking	 about	adiaphora.	
Every	reader	can	see	that	adiaphora were	adiaphorous	for	him	in	the	modern	
English	meaning	of	this	word:	neutral and insignificant	(as	a	noun:	placebo).	
It	is	true	even	in	the	case	of	his	early	writings	such	as	his	Erastian	work,	Two 
Tracts on Government.4	Later,	in	his	Epistola de tolerantia,	he	changed	his	
judgement,	but	did	not	change	his	 ironic	attitude.5	 It	 is	clear	 that	his	 irony	
does	not	refer	only	to	those	that	prohibit	adiaphora,	but	also	to	all	who	regard	
Milton,	 “Areopagitica”,	 in:	Charles	William	
Eliot	 (ed.),	 The Harvard Classics,	 Vol.	 III,	
Part	3,	P.	F.	Collier	&	Son,	New	York	1909–
1914,	 www.bartleby.com/3/3/	 (Accessed	 on	
28	December	2009).
3
Its	 modern	 edition	 see:	 Huldreich	 Zwingli,	
“Von	 erkiesen	 und	 fryheit	 der	 spysen.	 Von	
ärgernuss	 verböserung.	 Ob	man	 gewalt	 hab	
die	spysen	zu	etlichen	zyten	verbieten.	Mei-
nung	Huldrechen	Zwinglis	zu	Zürich	geyre-
diget	im	MDXXII.	jar.”	in:	Melchior	Schuler,	
Johannes	Schulthess	(eds.),	Huldreich Zwig­
li’s Werke. Erster Band. Der deutschen Schrif­
ten. Erster Theil. Lehr­ und Schußschriften 
zum Behuse des Ueberschrittes in die evan­
gelische Wahrheit und Fryheit von 1522 bis 
März 1524.,	 Friedrich	 Schultheiß,	 Zürich	
1828,	pp.	1–29.
4
It	 was	 a	 manuscript	 written	 for	 his	 educa-
tional	work	 during	his	 years	 in	Oxford.	 For	
its	first	printed	edition	see:	John	Locke,	Two 
Tracts on Government,	 Philip	 Abrams	 (ed.	
and	 transl.),	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
Cambridge,	1967.
5
Locke’s	writing,	written	in	Latin,	has	two	well-
known	English	translations:	Popple’s	version,	
written	in	the	17th	century	and	Gough’s	one,	
written	in	the	20th.	Both	of	these	translations	
were	accused	of	misinterpretation	of	Locke’s	
work,	 because	 of	 different	 reasons.	 I	 will	
quote	both	of	these	versions	in	order	to	cor-
rect	 them	 by	 comparison.	 See:	 John	 Locke,	
“A	 Letter	 Concerning	 Toleration”,	 William	
Popple	(transl.),	in:	John	Locke,	The Second 
Treatise of Civil Government and	 A Letter 
Concerning Toleration,	 J.	 W.	 Gough	 (ed.),	
Basil	Blackwell,	Oxford	1946,	pp.	121–165;	
John	Locke,	Epistola de Tolerantia. A Letter 
on Toleration,	Raymond	Klibansky	(ed.)	&	J.	
W.	Gough	(transl.	and	intr.),	Clarendon	Press,	
Oxford	1968.
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it	as	an	important	thing.	In	my	opinion,	this	style	is	derived	from	his	attitude	
as	an	educated	man.	Every	religious	opinion	is	serious	enough	for	him	to	be	
answered	theoretically,	because	they	are	explained	in	written	and	conceptual	
form,	but	rites	and	gestures	could	not	be	important	things,	their	seriousness	is	
only	a	product	of	superstitions	and	unskilled	thinking	of	uneducated	people.	
Let	us	see	his	opinion	in	his	Second (so-called	Latin)	Tract on Government:
“Deus	igitur	humanae	imbecilitati	consulens	cultum	suum	pro	more	uti	ferret	hominum	senten-
tia	externis	ritibus	ornandum	in	medio	reliquit,	nec	magis	ex	his	cultores	suos	quam	rex	subditos	
fidemque	et	obsequium	eorum	ex	corporis	habitu	aut	vestium	ornatu	aestimat,	nec	fideles	magis	
aut	Christiani	aut	cives	habendi	sunt	qui	negligentius	aut	vilius	ornantur.”6
However,	while	his	opinion	on	the	role	of	the	magistrate	changed	in	his	Epis­
tola de tolerantia,	 his	 attitude	on	non-written	and	mainly	non-verbal	 com-
munication	rested:
“Licetne	more	Romano	Deum	colere?	Liceat	et	Genevensi.	Permissumne	est	Latine	 loqui	 in	
foro?	Permittatur	etiam	quibus	libet	in	templo.	Fas	est	domi	suae	genua	flectere,	stare,	sedere,	
gesticulationibus	his	vel	illis	uti,	vestibus	albis	vel	nigris,	brevibus	vel	talaribus	indui?	In	eccle-
sia	nefas	ne	sit	panem	comedere,	vinum	bibere,	aqua	se	abluere;	reliquiaque	quae	in	communi	
vita	lege	libera	sunt,	in	sacro	cultu	libera	cuique	ecclesiae	permaneant.”7,8
Milton	also	inherited	this	twofold	discussion	of	Christian	freedom,	depending	
on	whether	he	speaks	about	the	book-culture	of	the	educated,	or	the	gestures	
and	rites	of	the	illiterate,	and,	as	we	shall	see,	he	polarises	the	question	even	
more	than	it	has	previously	been.
2.
Milton	–	in	accordance	with	his	own	Protestant	tradition	–	derives	his	time’s	
censorship	from	the	Papacy.	The	problem	and	its	solution	is	quite	clear	for	a	
17th-century	English	Protestant:	if	the	censorship	is	a	non-Christian	thing,	but	
it	is	still	existent	in	the	Christian	world,	than	the	reason	for	it	can	only	be	the	
Papacy,	meaning	both	the	real	Pope	and	the	Papistical	spirit	which	has	not	
completely	been	cleared	from	Church	of	England.
Milton	at	this	point	considers	his	time’s	censorship	as	an	institution	not	too	
old,	 almost	modern,	 appearing	 together	with	 the	book	printing,	 and	which	
is	the	dark	side	of	Christian	freedom	spreading	with	Reformation	and	book	
printing,	Rome’s	new	answer	to	a	new	phenomenon.	At	this	point	a	possibil-
ity	opens	up	for	the	re-thinking	of	tradition.	The	question	rises:	if	censorship	
is	something	new,	but	there	was	no	spiritual	freedom	in	pre-censorship	times,	
before	the	Reformation,	then	what	prevented	it	if	not	censorship?
3.
It	is	not	only	theoretically	that	Milton	tries	to	show	the	illegitimacy	of	Papal	
censorship,	but	he	also	strives	to	dispute	the	legitimacy	of	any	tradition,	con-
sidered	valuable	by	itself	and	by	its	public,	for	any kind	of	censorship.	First,	
he	lists	and	explains	from	his	own	point	of	view	certain	scriptural	fragments	
–	all	about	harmful	readings	–	which	seem	easily	usable	for	censorship:
“Salomon	 informs	us	 that	much	 reading	 is	 a	wearines	 to	 the	 flesh;	but	neither	he,	nor	other	
inspir’d	 author	 tells	 us	 that	 such,	 or	 such	 reading	 is	 unlawfull:	 [Ecclesiastes	 7:12]	 (…)	 the	
burning	of	those	Ephesian	books	by	St.	Pauls	converts,	(…)	was	a	privat	act,	a	voluntary	act,	
[Acts	19:19]”9
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Milton’s confrontation with the bi-medial 
tradition of literacy of the Antiquity
While	explaining	the	previous	Scriptural	fragments,	Milton	has	 to	continu-
ously	face	that	these	speak about something else	than	the	subject	of	his	de-
bates	with	his	contemporaries,	and	still,	he	has	to	find	some	kind	of	guidance	
from	these.	In	my	interpretation,	while	explaining	these	fragments,	and	main-
ly	in	his	reflections	on	Plato,	Milton	gradually	exceeds	his	time’s	typographic	
way	of	thinking	and	expression,	conceiving	surprisingly	modern	theses	about	
the	freedom	of	thinking	and	speech.	However,	in	the	Areopagitica,	these	new	
conceptions	–	as	we	shall	see	–	can	only	be	perceived	on	the	level	of	ironic	
remarks.	Apparently,	it	does	not	occur	to	Milton	to	consider	the	same	rights	
for	freedom	necessary	for	the	various	forms	of	non-written	communication	
that	he	is	just	claiming	for	books.
Following	the	above	Scriptural	examples,	which	are	relatively	easy	to	explain,	
Milton’s	explanations	and	references	in	the	interpretation	of	tradition	have	a	
more	nuanced	approach	to	the	world	of	book	culture,	hitherto	considered	uni-
fied.	It	is	revealed	that	the	content	of	books	is	not	equally	harmful	or	fruitful	
for	educated	and	uneducated	people,	and	thus	their	interdiction	or	allowance	
may	have	different	consequences.	The	difference	between	the	two	types	of	
readers	lies	exactly	in	their	ways	of	reading	and	interpretation:	an	uneducated	
man	only	understands	his	 reading	 if	 it	 is	explained	 to	him	 in	words;	 if	 the	
logic	of	censorship	is	taken	seriously,	this	means	that	not	only	books,	but	also	
ways of interpretation	considered	harmful	should	be	 interdicted	in	order	 to	
achieve	the	desired	effect:
“Such	tractates	whether	false	or	true	are	as	the	Prophesie	of	Isaiah	was	to	the	Eunuch,	not	to	be	
understood without a guide.	[Acts	7:	27-31]	(…)	evill	doctrine	not	with	books	can	propagate,	
except	a	teacher	guide,	which	he	might	also	doe	without	writing,	and	so	beyond	prohibiting.”10
In	 the	course	of	his	argumentation,	Milton	discovers	almost	by	chance	 the	
bi­mediality	preserved	since	the	Antiquity	and	the	Middle	Ages	in	the	world	
6
“Therefore	 God,	 indulging	 the	 weakness	 of	
mankind,	left	his	worship	undetermined,	to	be	
adorned	with	ceremonies	as	the	judgment	of	
men	might	determine	in	the	light	of	custom;	
and	he	no	more	judges	his	subjects	and	their	
loyalty	and	obedience	by	their	physical	con-
dition	or	the	style	of	there	clothes.	But	neither	
as	 Christian	 nor	 as	 subjects	 are	 those	 to	 be	
considered	more	 faithful	who	 are	 carelessly	
or	meanly	arrayed.”	J.	Locke,	Two Tracts on 
Government,	Philip	Abrams	(ed.	and	transl.),	
p.	191.
7
“Is	it	permissible	to	worship	God	in	the	Ro-
man	manner?	Let	it	also	be	permissible	in	the	
Genevan.	It	 is	allowed	to	speak	Latin	 in	 the	
market-place?	Let	those	who	wish	speak	it	in	
church	too.	Is	it	lawful	for	any	man	in	his	own	
house	to	kneel,	stand,	or	sit,	to	make	these	ges-
tures	or	those,	to	wear	white	or	black,	short	or	
long	garments?	Let	 it	not	be	made	unlawful	
to	eat	bread,	drink	wine,	or	wash	with	water	
in	church;	and	let	whatever	else	is	free	by	law	
in	ordinary	 life	 remain	 free	 to	 every	 church	
in	divine	worship.”	J.	Locke,	Epistola de Tol­
erantia. A Letter on Toleration,	J.	W.	Gough	
(transl.	and	intr.).
	 8
“Is	 it	 permitted	 to	 worship	 God	 in	 the	 Ro-
man	manner?	Let	 it	be	permitted	 to	do	 it	 in	
the	Geneva	form	also.	Is	it	permitted	to	speak	
Latin	in	the	market-place?	Let	those	that	have	
a	mind	to	it	be	permitted	to	do	it	also	in	the	
church.	 Is	 it	 lawful	 for	 any	man	 in	 his	 own	
house	 to	 kneel,	 stand,	 sit,	 or	 use	 any	 other	
posture;	 and	 to	 clothe	 himself	 in	 white	 or	
black,	in	short	or	in	long	garments?	Let	it	not	
be	made	 unlawful	 to	 eat	 bread,	 drink	wine,	
or	wash	with	water	in	the	church.	In	a	word,	
whatsoever	things	are	left	free	by	law	in	the	
common	 occasions	 of	 life,	 let	 them	 remain	
free	 unto	 every	 church	 in	 divine	 worship.”	
J,	Locke,	 “A	Letter	Concerning	Toleration”,	
William	Popple	(transl.),	p.	159.
	 9
J.	Milton,	“Areopagitica”,	§	13,	pp.	690–691.
10
Ibidem,	p.	693.
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of	his	time’s	uneducated	people.	It	is	this	not	yet	fully	developed	typographic	
culture	which	makes	Milton	to	consider	book	censorship	inadequate	as	com-
pared	to	its	declared	purposes.	(It	is	a	notable	detail,	that	his	example	of	the	
Ethiopian	eunuch	became	a	frequent	reference	for	bi­mediality	in	the	twenti-
eth	century	research,	in	the	same	meaning,	for	instance,	in	the	interpretation	
of	Jan	Assmann.11)
This	is	the	point	where	Milton	changes	his	line	of	thought.	Here,	on	the	ba-
sis	of	his	 references	 to	Plato,	and	besides	 the	rethinking	of	 the	 tradition	of	
spiritual	freedom,	he	says	that	censorship	was	unknown	in	the	Antiquity,	and	
what	we	are	inclined	to	consider	as	such	in	tradition,	is	in	fact	something	else.	
Now	Milton	 analyses	 the	 consequences	 of	 interpreting	 an	 antique	 text	 ac-
cording	to	the	early	modern	way	of	thinking,	that	is,	typographically.	Milton	
notices	in	Plato’s	text	that	he	does	not	suggest	primarily	the	banning	of	books	
or	concrete	texts,	but	rather	or	those	factors	which	influence	the	interpretation	
of	a	text,	factors	which	mainly	pertain	to	performing	arts:	forms	of	music	and	
dance,	types	and	tones	of	musical	instruments,	and	even	certain	movements	
of	physical	jerks.	Plato	speaks	here	–	using	a	modern	term	–	about	an	influ-
ence	on	interpretative	communities,	which	form	around	texts,	and	especially	
on	their	elite,	about	the	education	of	those	who	will	be	able	to	create	such	an	
interpretative	“guidance”	which	Philip	gave	to	the	Ethiopian	eunuch,	and	the	
importance	of	which	for	the	commoners	Milton	himself	acknowledged.
Plato	in	 the	third	book	of	his	Republic constructs	quite	clearly	 the	elite	 in-
terpretative	 community	 similar	 to	 the	 scribes	 of	 the	East:	 he	 speaks	 about	
choosing	persons	who	have	the	best	memory	(412e–413d),	resembles	their,	
and	only	their,	relation	to	virtue	of	the	engravement	of	letters	(402a–b),	and	
then	leaves	the	task	for	this	elite	to	interpret	tradition	for	all	the	others,	even	
if	manipulating	it	for	state	reasons.	(See	the	paragraphs	about	lying	and	about	
fictive myths.)	Plato	mostly	exposes	his	 thoughts	quoted	in	Areopagitica	 in	
the	context	of	education,	which	he	thinks	of	as	being	outside	legal	regulation,	
at	 least	 in	his	Laws:	“education	(…)	may	be	thought	a	subject	fitted	rather	
for	precept	and	admonition	than	for	law.”12	In	other	places,	however,	Plato	
clearly	admits	the	consequences	of	such	a	guidance	of	common	culture:	this	
means	the	need	for	a	re­sacralisation	and	re­contextualisation	of	texts,	and	
not	only	for	the	years	of	education,	but	for	the	whole	duration	of	human	life,	
and	for	all	fields	of	culture:	“if	any	one	offers	any	other	hymns	or	dances	to	
any	one	of	the	Gods,	the	priests	and	priestesses,	(…)	shall	(…)	exclude	him	
[for]	all	his	life	long”.13
From	the	perspective	of	this	presentation,	Plato’s	quoted	texts	can	be	inter-
preted	as	 the	rules	of	a	special	elite’s	education.	The	Athenian	philosopher	
means	to	maintain	at	the	same	time	the	authority	of	the	professional remem­
berers	of	oral	societies,	and	the	scripturalist elite	of	early	written	culture,	and	
to	teach	this	elite	the	thinking	skills	developed	by	contemporary	literacy.	The	
education	of	the	elite	is	rational	and	initiatory	at	the	same	time.	These	texts	
speak	with	a	surprising	openness	about	the	meaning	of	this	education	and	its	
later	uses:	the	elite’s	thinking	skills	enable	rule	over	the	commoners’	beliefs,	
and	minds	which	lack	such	techniques.
The	 irony	 of	 the	 Plato-references	 in	 the	Areopagitica	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that,	
although	 the	 author	 notices	 that	 the	 interpretative	 context	 of	 theses	 of	 the	
Athenian	philosopher	is	not	the	culture	of	printed	books,	he	can	only	express	
the	transposition	of	these	ideas	into	the	17th	century	if	he	presumes	that	Plato	
speaks	all along	about	the	censoring	of	texts	and	documents.	However,	what	
is	 in	Plato’s	case	 the	centre	of	an	elite	culture,	 for	Milton	 it	 is	only	hardly	
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noticed	rural	phenomenon.	In	Milton’s	time,	the	transmission	of	closed	texts	
to	the	world	of	oral	culture	was	partly	found	in	the	field	of	private	life	(that	is	
why	he	speaks	about	the	instruments	and	tunes	of	home	music	and	singing,	
young	people’s	chatting	and	entertainment)	and	partly	in	the	case	of	unedu-
cated	commoners	(that	is	why	he	sometimes	mentions	rustic	instruments	and	
refers	to	rural	images).	The	result	would	then	be	a	text	in	which	everything	
that	Plato	has	 to	 say	about	 the	 formation	of	elite	 interpretative	community	
appears	as	the	censorship	of	the	“books”	of	non-readers.	And	when	the	text,	
nevertheless,	refers	back	to	bi­mediality,	then	we	fail	to	take	seriously	that	it	
has	important	things	to	say	about	spiritual	freedom,	because	the	way	of	saying	
it	is	taken	from	elite	culture	into	a	rustic	context.
“The	Windows	also,	and	the	Balcone’s	must	be	thought	on,	there	are	shrewd	books,	with	dange-
rous	Frontispieces	set	to	sale;	who	shall	prohibit	them,	shall	twenty	licencers?	The	villages	also	
must	have	their	visitors	to	enquire	what	lectures	the	bagpipe,	and	the	rebbeck	reads	ev’n	to	the	
ballatry,	and	the	gammuth	of	every	municipal	fiddler.”14
The	impossibility	of	censoring	the	elements	of	a	building	like	books	needs	
no	further	comment,	but	 let	us	examine	 the	following	sentence:	“what	 lec-
tures	the	bagpipe	and	the	rebbeck	reads”.	Rebbeck,	a	rural	form	of	violin	with	
three	fiddle-strings	and	bagpipes	are	not	 the	 instruments	of	concerts	of	 the	
middle-class	saloons.	We	are	in	a	village	pub,	where,	by	Milton,	these	rural	
instruments	not	only	speak	about	something,	but	read,	or	hold a lecture	for	
the	audience	of	a	country	inn.	The	word	lecture	– derived	from	lectura	of	the	
Medieval	Latin	–	is	a	special,	scholar	word	for	a	special,	interpretative	read-
ing	of	a	text,	especially	in	a	university.15	Target	audience	of	Milton’s	booklet	
presumably	had	concrete	experiences	of	this	genre	of	speech;	consequently	
the	irony	probably	well	understood	in	Milton’s	 time	lies	 in	 the	fact	 that	he	
raises	for	a	moment	villagers’	performances	to	elite	book	culture,	and	all	the	
things	worth	to	be	banned.
Conclusion
Milton’s	line	of	thought	in	the	context	of	the	whole	work	means	a	return	to	an	
idea	apparently	closed,	but	now	highlighted	from	the	opposite	direction:	it	is	
a	contrary	approach	to	the	reformulation	of	Christian	freedom	from	the	adia­
phora	debates	to	the	freedom	of	the	press.	Referring	to	Zwingli’s	aforemen-
tioned	case,	and	according	to	the	text’s	inner	line	of	thought,	time	would	now	
come	to	defend	the	legitimacy,	freedom,	and	especially	notability	of	actions	
similar	to	fried	sausage-eating	in	the	Lenten	period,	even	if	in	the	sphere	of	
11
See:	Jan	Assmann,	Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. 
Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in 
frühen Hochkulturen	(Cultural Memory. Writ­
ing, Remembrance, and Political Identity in 
Early Advanced Civilisations),	Verlag	C.	H.	
Beck,	München	1992.	 I	have	used	 the	Hun-
garian	version	(Atlantisz,	Budapest,	1999).
12
In	my	quotations	of	Plato	I	have	used	a	quite	
ancient	English	 version	 of	 Plato’s	 texts,	 be-
cause	the	modern	translations	could	be	too	far	
from	Milton’s	style.	See:	Plato,	Laws,	Benja-
min	 Jowett	 (transl.),	 Macmillan,	 New	York	
1892,	VII,	788a.
13
Plato,	Laws, VII,	799a–b.
14
J.	Milton,	“Areopagitica”,	§	13,	p.	696.
15
For	the	cultural	history	of	the	genre	lectura	see	
the	study	of	Jacqueline	Hamese	in:	Guglielmo	
Cavallo,	 Roger	 Charier	 (eds.),	 Storia della 
lettura nel mondo occidentale	 (A History of 
Reading in the West),	Laterza,	Roma	1995.	It	
is	available	in	French,	too	(Editions	du	Seuil,	
1997).	 I	 have	 used	 the	 Hungarian	 version	
(Balassi,	Budapest,	2000).
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politics,	starting	from	the	already	justified	freedom	of	the	press.	While	com-
pleting	this	task,	however,	Milton	–	though	in	a	genial,	thoughtful,	and	witty	
manner	–	fails.	It	is	highly	characteristic	how	he	explains	the	quoted	texts	of	
Plato,	guiding	the	discourse	to	fields	familiar	to	him.	In	Milton’s	opinion,	the	
Athenian	master	always	thinks	of	education,	and	that	is	not	a	subject	pertain-
ing	to	the	subordination	of	authorities	and	censorship.	Regardless	of	this,	Mil-
ton	stresses,	from	the	very	beginning,	that	he	only	refers	Christian	freedom	
to	adult	people,	and	even	from	them	only	takes	into	account	educated	males.	
(This	is	not	evident	from	the	very	beginning	because	he	always	speaks	about	
the	extension	of	freedom,	and	not	it’s	narrowing.	He	wanted	an	extension	–	at 
least	to	the	circle	of	educated	lay	men.)
Milton’s	barrier	to	make	one	more,	important	step	on	the	way	of	expanding	
the	freedom	of	thinking	and	speech	was	in	fact	his	own	solution	to	include	
education	in	the	debate:	if	the	world	outside	book	culture	were	a	part	of	the	
life	 of	 children,	 women	 and	 common	 people,	 then	 its	 ways	 of	 expression	
would	have	no	role	in	the	intellectual	freedom	of	spiritually	adult	people.	(It	
was	a	suitable	point	to	research	the	crucial	roles	of	opinions	on	education	in	
Milton’s	and	Locke’s	systems	of	ideas,	but	I	am	afraid,	it	is	far	from	today’s	
topic	of	mine.)
Areopagitica	reveals	for	a	moment	the	possible	existence	and	freedom	of	a	
culture	outside	book	culture,	but	Milton	instantly	identifies	this	world	with	
the	world	of	children,	uneducated	commoners,	and	women,	that	is,	with	the	
world	of	people	who	are	 incapable	and	unworthy	of	freedom.	Any	novelty	
he	finds	in	human	communication	is	exiled	to	the	countryside,	or	confined	to	
children’s	room,	women’s	quarter,	schools,	kitchens,	and	the	inns	of	the	lower	
classes.	It	is	all	the	same	to	him	where	these	apparently	rudimentary	non­ty­
pographic	forms	of	expression	of	identity	and	opinion	disappear	as	long	as	
they	stay	away	from	the	sphere	of	politics.	Milton	behaves	here	as	someone	
who	opens	a	yet	unknown	door	only	in	order	to	close	it	with	an	even	bigger	
lock.
béla Mester
Cenzura kao tipografska himera
John Milton i John Locke o gestama
Sažetak
Namjera je ovog rada pokazati neke elemente Miltonovih i Lockeovih političkih spisa, ovisno 
o njihovim odnosima prema različitim medijima. Milton u svojoj argumentaciji protiv cenzure 
mora pokazati da se sve drevne instance za cenzuru, često citirane u njegovom stoljeću, mogu 
interpretirati kao primjeri drugog fenomena. Međutim, Milton prepoznaje, analizirajući mjesta 
u Platonovoj Državi i nekim biblijskim temama, doseg i značaj nepojmovnih, netiskanih, never­
balnih oblika komunikacije; on ih opisuje kao znakove djetinjastog, ženskog ili neobrazovanog 
ponašanja, kao beznačajne fenomene iz perspektive političke slobodne utjelovljene u slobodi 
tiska. Stav Johna Lockea je isti. Pokazat ću lanac ideja, sličan Miltonovom, u njegovim djelima 
Dvije	rasprave	o	vladi i Pismo	o	toleranciji, fokusirajući analizu na pojam adijafore (indiferent-
nih	stvari).
Ključne riječi
cenzura,	usmenost,	tipografsko	doba,	Platon	o	cenzuri,	adijafora,	John	Miltonova	Areopagitika,	John	
Lockeovo	Pismo o toleranciji
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béla Mester
Die Zensur als typografische Chimäre
John Milton und John Locke zu den Gesten
Zusammenfassung
Die Intention meiner Arbeit ist, einige Elemente in Miltons und Lockes politischen Schriften auf­
zuweisen, abhängig von ihren Einstellungen zu diversen Medien. Milton hat in seiner Argumen­
tierung gegen die Zensur darzulegen, dass alle historischen Instanzen der Zensur – gewöhnlich 
zitiert in seinem Jahrhundert – als Beispiele eines anderen Phänomens ausgedeutet werden 
können. Demgegenüber erkennt Milton, indem er unterschiedliche Loci in Platons Der	Staat 
sowie einigen biblischen Themen analysiert, die Reichweite als auch Gewichtigkeit der nicht­
begrifflichen, ungedruckten, nichtverbalen Kommunikationsformen; er schildert sie als Zeichen 
des kindischen, weiblichen oder ungebildeten Verhaltens, als wertlose Phänomene aus dem 
Blickwinkel der in der Pressefreiheit verkörperten politischen Libertät. John Lockes Einstellung 
ist übereinstimmend. Ich erläutere eine Ideenkette, analog zu jener Miltons, in seinen Werken 
Zwei	Abhandlungen	über	die	Regierung und Epistola	de	tolerantia, indem ich die Analyse auf 
den Begriff der Adiaphora (der neutralen	Dinge) fokussiere.
Schlüsselwörter
Zensur,	Oralität,	typografisches	Zeitalter,	Platon	über	die	Zensur,	Adiaphora,	John	Miltons	Areopagi­
tica,	John	Lockes	Epistola de tolerantia
béla Mester
La censure en tant que chimère typographique
John Milton et John Locke à propos des gestes
Résumé
L’objectif de cet article est de mettre en lumière quelques éléments tirés des écrits politiques de 
John Milton et de John Locke, en fonction de leur attitude à l’égard des différents médias. Dans 
son argumentation contre la censure, John Milton doit démontrer que toutes les anciennes in­
stances de censure, citées souvent à son époque, peuvent être interprétées comme des exemples 
d’un autre phénomène. Cependant, John Milton reconnaît, en analysant les lieux communs dans 
la République de Platon ainsi que dans certains textes bibliques, la portée et la signification 
des formes non­conceptuelles, non­imprimées, non­verbales de communication ; il les décrit 
comme des signes d’un comportement enfantin, féminin ou inculte, comme des phénomènes 
sans importance d’un point de vue de liberté politique incarnée dans la liberté de la presse. La 
position de John Locke est la même. Je montrerai l’enchaînement des idées, similiaire à celui de 
Milton, dans ses ouvrages Deux	traités	du	gouvernement	et Lettre	sur	la	tolérance, en focalisant 
mon analyse sur le concept d’adiaphora (les	choses	indifférentes).
Mots-clés
censure,	oralité,	ère	typographique,	Platon	à	propos	de	la	censure,	adiaphora,	Areopagitica	de	John	
Milton,	Lettre sur la tolérance	de	John	Locke
